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NOTE ON SOME MISINTERPRETATIONS OF GO¨DEL’S
INCOMPLETENESS THEOREMS
YONG CHENG
Abstract. In this paper, I evaluate some formal and informal misinter-
pretations of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems from the literature and
the folklore, as well as clarify some misunderstandings about Go¨del’s
incompleteness theorems based on the current research on Go¨del’s in-
completeness theorems in the literature.
1. Introduction
Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems are one of the most remarkable and pro-
found discoveries in the 20th century, an important milestone in the history
of modern logic. Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems have wide and profound
influence on the development of logic, philosophy, mathematics, computer
science and other fields, substantially shaping mathematical logic as well as
foundations and philosophy of mathematics after 1931.
Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems show certain weaknesses and limitations
of one given formal system. For Go¨del, his incompleteness theorems indicate
the creative power of human reason. In Post’s celebrated words: mathemat-
ical proof is an essentially creative activity. The impact of Go¨del’s incom-
pleteness theorems is not confined to the community of mathematicians and
logicians, and they have been very popular and widely used outside mathe-
matics. For the impact of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems, Feferman said:
“their relevance to mathematical logic (and its offspring in the theory of
computation) is paramount; further, their philosophical relevance is signifi-
cant, but in just what way is far from settled; and finally, their mathematical
relevance outside of logic is very much unsubstantiated but is the object of
ongoing, tantalizing efforts” (see [28], p.434).
Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems raise a number of philosophical ques-
tions concerning the nature of logic and mathematics, as well as mind and
machine. There are ample misinterpretations of Go¨del’s incompleteness the-
orems from the literature and the folklore. Franzen’s [31] is a popular book
about the use and misuse of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems in and out-
side mathematics and logic for a wider audience. In [31], Franzen comments
on a fairly wide selection of the many invocations of the incompleteness
theorems outside mathematics.1 In this paper, I will focus on some misin-
terpretations of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems in mathematics and logic
I would like to thank Prof. Albert Visser for his comments for improvement on the
original version of this manuscript.
1The structure of [31] is as follows: in Chapter 2 and 3, the author gave an introduction
to the mathematics of incompleteness, along with a discussion of some basic philosophical
issues; in Chapter 4-6 and 8, the author discussed some applications of the incompleteness
1
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which are not covered in [31]. Both this paper and Franzen’s book have
discussed the mechanism thesis and Lucas-Penrose arguments. But the dis-
cussion in Franzen’s book is mainly from the philosophical perspective and
the discussion in this paper is mainly from the logical perspective based on
some recent work on Go¨del’s disjunctive thesis.
The motivation of this paper is to review and evaluate some formal and
informal misinterpretations of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems and their
consequences from the literature and the folklore as well as to clarify some
confusions based on the current research on Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems
in the literature. There are some good survey papers on Go¨del’s incomplete-
ness theorems in the literature, i.e. [96],[3], [59],[103]. This paper is not a
survey paper on the current status of research on incompleteness; instead,
in this paper I only focus on how recent research on incompleteness clarifies
some popular misinterpretations of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I review some notions
and facts we will use in this paper. In Section 3, I discuss some misin-
terpretations of Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem (G1). In particular, I
will focus on the following interpretations or aspects of G1: the claim that
there is a truth that cannot be proved; the metaphorical application of G1
outside mathematics and logic; the claim that any consistent formal system
is incomplete; the claim that any consistent extension of PA is incomplete;
the dependence of incompleteness on the language of the theory; the dif-
ference between the theory of arithmetic and the theory of reals; the claim
that Go¨del’s proof is paradoxical due to the use of the Liar Paradox; the
difference between the notion of provability in PA and the notion of truth
in the standard model; sentences of arithmetic independent of PA with real
mathematical content; and the theory with the minimal degree of interpre-
tation for which G1 holds. In Section 4, I discuss some misinterpretations
of Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem (G2). In particular, I will focus
on the following interpretations or aspects of G2: a delicate mistake for the
proof of G2; the vagueness of the consistency statement; the intensionality
of G2; the claim that the Drivability Conditions (see D1-D3 in Section 2)
are the necessary conditions to show that G2 holds for PA; the claim that
G2 holds for any consistent extension of PA; the claim that there are arith-
metic truths which cannot be proved in any formal theory in the language
of arithmetic; the claim that the consistency of PA can only be proved in
a stronger theory properly extending PA; and the claim that G2 refutes
Hilbert’s program. In Section 5, I discuss the popular interpretation that
Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems show that the mechanism thesis fails.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, I review some basic notions and facts used in this paper.
Our notations are standard. For the theory of recursive function, we refer
to [22], [73], [88]. For details of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems, we refer
to [21], [73], [67], [95], [9]. For meta-mathematics of subsystems of PA, we
refer to [40]. For a standard textbook on reverse mathematics, we refer to
theorems outside mathematics and the philosophy of mathematics (e.g. in theology and
in the philosophy of mind as well as the philosophical claims of Gregory Chaitin).
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[94]. For a comprehensive book on incompleteness in concrete mathematics,
we refer to [32].
A formal system has four components: a formal language, rules for the
formation of formulas, a set of axioms and a set of reference rules. For a
formal system T , let L(T ) denote the formal language of T . For formula
φ in L(T ), φ is provable in T (denoted by T ⊢ φ) iff there exists a finite
sequence of formulas 〈φ0, · · · , φn〉 such that φn = φ, and for any 0 ≤ i ≤ n,
either φi is an axiom of T or φi follows from some φj (j < i) by using one
inference rule. T is consistent if no contradiction is provable in T . φ is in-
dependent of T if T 0 φ and T 0 ¬φ. T is complete if for any sentence φ in
L(T ), either T ⊢ φ or T ⊢ ¬φ; otherwise, T is incomplete.2 An idea formal
system should be both consistent (free of contradictions) and complete (rep-
resenting all the truth). A theory is a set of sentences provable in a formal
system. In this paper we focus on first order theory based on countable first
order language, and always assume the arithmetization of the language of
first order theory. Under arithmetization, any formula or finite sequence of
formulas in first order theory can be coded by a natural number (this code
is called Go¨del’s number). In this paper, we use pφq denote the numeral in
L(PA) of the Go¨del number of φ. A theory T is decidable if the set of Go¨del
numbers of sentences provable in T is recursive; otherwise it is undecidable.
In this paper, whenever we say a set of sentences has an arithmetic property
we always mean that the set of Go¨del numbers of sentences in this set has
the corresponding arithmetic property. T is recursively axiomatizable if it
has a recursive set of axioms;3 T is r.e. if it has a recursive enumerable
set of axioms. T is essentially undecidable if any recursively axiomatized
consistent extension of T is undecidable. T is essentially incomplete if all
recursively axiomatizable consistent extensions of T are incomplete. It is
well known that every consistent recursively axiomatizable complete theory
is decidable; and every incomplete decidable theory has a consistent, de-
cidable complete extension in the same language (see Corollary 3.1.8 and
Theorem 3.1.9 in [73], p. 214-215). From these two facts, T is essentially
undecidable if and only if T is essentially incomplete; and the theory of
completeness/incompleteness is closely related to the theory of decidabil-
ity/undecidability. T is minimal essentially incomplete iff if deleting any
axiom of T , the remaining theory is no longer essentially incomplete. For
the definitions of Σ0n, Π
0
n and ∆
0
n formulas in the arithmetic hierarchy, we
refer to [22] and [73].
A n-ary relation R(x1, · · · , xn) on Nn is representable in T iff there
is a formula φ(x1, · · · , xn) such that if R(m1, · · · ,mn) holds, then T ⊢
φ(m1, · · · ,mn);
4 and ifR(m1, · · · ,mn) does not hold, then T ⊢ ¬φ(m1, · · · ,mn).
A theory T is said to be ω-consistent if there is no formula ϕ(x) such that
T ⊢ ∃xϕ(x) and for any n ∈ N, T ⊢ ¬ϕ(n¯); and T is 1-consistent if there
is no such a ∆01 formula ϕ(x). We say that function f(x1, · · · , xn) on N
n is
representable in T if and only if there exists a formula ϕ(x1, · · · , xn, y) such
that for any a1, · · · , an ∈ N, T ⊢ ∀y(ϕ(a1, · · · , an, y)↔ y = f(a1, · · · , an)).
2I.e., there exists a sentence φ in L(T ) such that φ is independent of T .
3I.e. the set of Go¨del numbers of axioms of T is recursive.
4For n ∈ N, n¯ denotes the corresponding numeral in L(PA) for n.
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The notion of interpretation provides us a method to compare different
theories in different languages. Generally, an interpretation of theory T in
theory S is a mapping from formulas of T to formulas of S that maps all
axioms of T to sentences provable in S. For the premise definition of the
notion of interpretation, we refer to [101],[102], [103]. If T is interpretable
in S, then all sentences provable (refutable) in T are mapped, by the inter-
pretation function, to sentences provable (refutable) in S. Let T ✂S denote
that T is interpretable in S. T ✁ S denotes that T ✂ S but S is not inter-
pretable in T . We say that T and S are mutually interpretable if T ✂ S
and S✂T . Interpretability can be accepted as a measure of strength of first
order theory. If T ✁ S, then T can be considered weaker than S; if T and S
are mutually interpretable, then T and S are equally strong. Whenever we
say that S is weaker than T w.r.t. interpretation, this means that S ✁ T .
The following Theorem 2.1 provides us a method to prove the undecid-
ability of theory via interpretation.
Theorem 2.1. ([97, Theorem 7, p.22]) Let T1 and T2 be two theories such
that T1 is consistent and T2 is interpretable in T1. We then have:
(1) if T2 is essentially incomplete, then T1 is also essentially incomplete;
(2) if T2 has a finitely axiomatizable sub-theory which is essentially incom-
plete, then so has T1.
Peano Arithmetic (PA) is the first order theory of arithmetic with L(PA) =
{0,S,+, ·}. PA consists of axioms for first order logic and the following ax-
ioms for arithmetic: (1) ∀x∀y(Sx = Sy → x = y); (2) ∀x(Sx 6= 0); (3)
∀x∀y(x + 0 = x); (4) ∀x∀y(x + Sy = S(x + y)); (5) ∀x(x · 0 = 0); (6)
∀x∀y(x ·Sy = x ·y+x); and (7) the scheme of induction: (φ(0)∧∀x(φ(x) →
φ(Sx))) → ∀xφ(x), where φ is a formula in L(PA) with at least one free
variable x. In this paper, N = (N,0,S,+, ·) denotes the standard model of
PA. We say φ ∈ L(PA) is a true sentence if N |= φ. Robinson’s arithmetic
Q is a sub-theory of PA which consists of axioms (1)-(6) in the definition of
PA plus the following axiom: ∀x(x 6= 0→ ∃y (x = Sy)). IΣ0n is a fragment
of PA obtained by restricting the axiom scheme of induction to Σ0n formulas.
For the definition of the fragment IΣ0n, we refer to [40].
Definition 2.2. Let R be the system consisting of schemes R1-R5 with
L(PA) = {0,S,+, ·,≤} where m,n ∈ N and n = Sn(0).
R1: m+ n = m+ n;
R2: m · n = m · n;
R3: m 6= n if m 6= n;
R4: ∀x(x ≤ n→ x = 0 ∨ · · · ∨ x = n);
R5: ∀x(x ≤ n ∨ n ≤ x).
R is a sub-theory of Q. Q is finitely axiomatizable but R is not finitely
axiomatizable. Q is essentially incomplete and in fact minimal essentially
incomplete (see [73], p.260).
In the following, we give a sketch of the main idea of Go¨del’s proof of
G1 and G2. Let T be a recursively axiomatized consistent extension of
PA in L(PA). The three main ideas in Go¨del’s proof of G1 and G2 are the
arithmetization of the syntax of T , the representability of recursive functions
in PA and the self-reference construction.
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Firstly, Go¨del gives a recursive arithmetization of axioms of PA.5 Then
we could define some relations on natural numbers which express some meta-
mathematical properties of T . For example, we could define a binary relation
on N2 as follows: PrfT (m,n) iff n is the Go¨del’s number of a proof of the for-
mula with Go¨del number m in T . Moreover, we can prove that the relation
PrfT (m,n) is recursive. Secondly, Go¨del proves that every recursive relation
is representable in PA and hence there is a formula φ(x, y) which represents
PrfT (m,n) in PA.
6 From the representation formula φ(x, y), we could natu-
rally define the provability predicatePrT (x) as follows: PrT (x) = ∃y φ(x, y).
Thirdly, Go¨del constructs a Go¨del sentence G which asserts its own unprov-
ability in T , i.e. T ⊢ G ↔ ¬PrPA(pGq). Finally, Go¨del shows that if PA
is consistent, then G is not provable in PA; and if PA is ω-consistent, then
¬G is not provable in PA.
The provability predicate PrT (x) satisfies the following conditions:
D1: If T ⊢ ϕ, then T ⊢ PrT (pϕq);
D2: T ⊢ PrT (pϕq) → (PrT (pϕ→ ψq)→ PrT (pψq));
D3: T ⊢ PrT (pϕq) → PrT (pPrT (pϕq)q).
D1-D3 are called drivability conditions. For the proof of G2, we first define
the sentence in L(PA) which expresses the consistency of PA as follows:
Con(PA) , ¬PrPA(p0 = 1q). From conditions D1-D3, we can show
that PA ⊢ Con(PA) ↔ G. So G2 holds: if PA is consistent, then PA 0
Con(PA). For more details of Go¨del’s proof of G1 and G2, see Chapter 2
in [73].
A first-order theory T containing PA is said to be reflexive iff for each
finite sub-theory S of T , T ⊢ Con(S) where Con(S) is similarly defined
as Con(PA). T is essentially reflective if any consistent extension of T
in L(T ) is reflective. Mostowski proved that PA is essentially reflective
(see [73, Theorem 2.6.12]). In fact one can show that for every n ∈ N,
IΣ0n+1 ⊢ Con(IΣ
0
n).
7
3. Some popular misinterpretations of Go¨del’s first
incompleteness theorem
The popular folklore version of G1 says that any recursively axiomatized
consistent theory containing a large enough fragment of arithmetic is in-
complete. This statement is vague. In the following, I will reformulate and
discuss some precise versions of G1. Go¨del proved his incompleteness the-
orems in [34] for a certain formal system P related to Russell-Whitehead’s
Principia Mathematica and based on the simple theory of types over the nat-
ural number series and the Dedekind-Peano axioms (see [3], p.3). Go¨del’s
original first incompleteness theorem ([34, Theorem VI]) says that for for-
mal theory T formulated in the language of P and obtained by adding a
primitive recursive set of axioms to the system P, if T is ω-consistent, then
5For the details of arithmetization, refer to Murawski [73]. Under Go¨del’s arithmeti-
zation, the set of Go¨del’s number of axioms of PA is recursive.
6Via arithmetization and representability, one can speak about the property of T in
PA itself! This is the essence of Go¨del’s idea of arithmetization.
7For a proof of this result, we refer to Ha´jek and Pudla´k [40].
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T is incomplete. Rosser improved Go¨del’s result by only assuming T is con-
sistent. The following theorem is a modern reformulation of Go¨del-Rosser
incompleteness theorem.
Theorem 3.1. (Go¨del-Rosser first incompleteness theorem (G1)) If T is
a recursively axiomatized consistent extension of PA, then T is incomplete.8
One motivation of Hilbert’s program is to formalize all mathematical
statements and prove the completeness: all true mathematical statements
can be proved in this formalism. Go¨del’s work showed that it is not possible
to formalize all of mathematics within a consistent formal system, as any
attempt at such a formalism will omit some true mathematical statements:
there is no complete recursively enumerable consistent extension of PA.
First of all, I discuss some misinterpretations of the applicability of Go¨del’s
incompleteness theorems outside mathematics. In ordinary language we
also often use expressions such as “system”, “consistency”, “inconsistency”,
“complete” and “incomplete”. It is not surprising that G1 has been thought
to have a great many applications outside mathematics. G1 is about the
consistency and completeness of formal theory containing enough arithmetic
with precise mathematical meaning. So we should be careful when interpret-
ing G1 outside logic. However, the implications of G1 are often overstated.
Some argue that G1 also applies to the Bible, the U. S. Constitution, philo-
sophical theory and human mind: since we can view the Bible, the U. S.
Constitution, the theory of philosophy and the human mind as a formal sys-
tem. However, G1 does not apply in contexts where there’s no formal system
like the Bible, the U.S.Constitution, the informal theory of philosophy and
the human mind, etc. Some argue that G1 applies to not only mathematics
but also the whole world of science: since we can view scientific theory as a
formal system, by G1, there is no such theory of everything in science. G1
only tells us the incompleteness of arithmetic, but whether or not the theory
of science is complete as a description of the physical world, and what com-
pleteness might mean in this case, is not something that G1 tells us anything
about.9 As Franzen argued in [31], these applications of the incompleteness
theorems are at most analogies and metaphors at best. G1 only guarantees
the existence of undecidable arithmetical statements in certain formal the-
ory; but it says nothing about the existence of undecidable non-arithmetical
statements. In a word, G1 has really no applications except metaphorical
ones beyond the scope of formal theory in logic and mathematics.
It is often said that G1 shows that there is a truth that cannot be proved.
This interpretation of G1 is not premise and correct: provability is always
relative to a formal system; informally G1 only tells us that for a given formal
system, if it is consistent and contains a large enough fragment of PA, then
there is a true sentence which is independent of this system. G1 does not
tell us that the independent sentence in one formal system is not provable in
8In fact, one can effectively find a true Π01 sentence GT of arithmetic such that
GT is independent of T . Go¨del calls this the “incompletability or inexhaustability of
mathematics”.
9See Chapter 4 in [31] for more discussions about misuses of the incompleteness theo-
rems outside mathematics.
NOTE ON SOME MISINTERPRETATIONS OF GO¨DEL’S INCOMPLETENESS THEOREMS7
any formal system. In fact, a problem unprovable in a given formal system
can turn out to be provable in another stronger formal system.10
A popular misinterpretation of G1 from folklore is that any consistent
formal system is incomplete. G1 does not tell us this and informally G1
only tells us that any consistent formal system containing a large enough
fragment of PA is incomplete. In fact there are many consistent formal
theories which are complete. For example, the following formal theories
are complete: first-order logic, the theory of dense linear orderings without
endpoints (DLO), the theory of ordered divisible groups (ODG), the theory
of algebraically closed fields of given characteristic (ACFp), and the theory
of real closed fields (RCF), etc.11
It is a popular misinterpretation of G1 that any theory of arithmetic is
incomplete. In fact, whether a theory of arithmetic is complete depends
on the language of the theory. There are respectively recursively axiom-
atized complete arithmetic theories in the language of L(0,S), L(0,S, <)
and L(0,S, <,+) (see Section 3.1-3.2 in [21]). But PA is not complete in
the language of L(0,S,+, ·). Firstly, the condition in G1 that containing
a large enough fragment of PA is essential. For example, the Euclidean
geometry does not satisfy this condition: it is not about arithmetic but only
about points, circles and lines in general; but the Euclidean geometry is
complete as Tarski has proved. Secondly, containing the information about
the arithmetic of multiplication is essential for the proof of G1. If the the-
ory contains only the information about the arithmetic of addition without
multiplication, then it could be complete. For example, Presburger arith-
metic is the theory of arithmetic of addition, and its language only contains
non-logical symbols 0,S and +; but Presburger arithmetic is complete (see
[73, Theorem 3.2.2], p. 222). Finally, theory containing the arithmetic of
multiplication is not sufficient for being incomplete. For example, there ex-
ists a complete recursively axiomatized theory in the language of L(0,S, ·)
(see [73], p.230).
It is a popular misinterpretation of G1 that since PA is not complete and
N ⊆ Z ⊆ Q ⊆ R, theory about integers, rational numbers and real num-
bers are all incomplete. It is well known that Th(N,+, ·) is interpretable
in Th(Z,+, ·) and Th(Q,+, ·).12 Since Th(N,+, ·) is undecidable and has a
finitely axiomatizable incomplete sub-theoryQ, by Theorem 2.1, Th(Z,+, ·)
and Th(Q,+, ·) are undecidable and hence not recursive axiomatizable but
they respectively have a finitely axiomatizable incomplete sub-theory of inte-
gers and rational numbers. But Th(R,+, ·) is decidable, recursively axiom-
atizable theory (even if not finitely axiomatizable) and Th(R,+, ·) = RCF
(the theory of real closed field) (see [23], p.320-321). Note that this fact
does not contradict G1 since none of N,Z and Q is definable in the structure
(R,+, ·).
10Even if mathematicians can always use axiomatic-deductive method to organize and
present their proofs, mathematicians do not work in one fixed formal system in their re-
search practices; instead they could use various methods and means that would contribute
to finding a solution to the problem they are working on.
11We refer to [23] for details of these theories.
12See chapter XVI in [23]. The key point is: N is definable in (Z,+, ·) and (Q,+, ·).
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A popular interpretation of G1 is that any consistent extension of PA is
incomplete. This interpretation is false based on the recent work in [50] on
generalizing G1 to arithmetically definable theory.
Definition 3.2. Let T be a theory and Γ be a class of formulas.
(1) T is Σ0n-definable iff there is a Σ
0
n formula α(x) such that n is the Go¨del
number of some sentence of T if and only if N |= α(n).
(2) T is Σ0n-sound if and only if for all Σ
0
n sentences φ, if T ⊢ φ, then N |= φ.
(3) T is Γ-decisive if and only if for all Γ sentences φ, either T ⊢ φ or T ⊢ ¬φ
holds.
From G1 and Craig’s trick, if theory T is Σ01-definable and consistent
extension of PA, then T is not Π01-decisive. In [50], Kikuchi and Kurahashi
generalized G1 to arithmetically definable theory.
Theorem 3.3. ([50, Theorem 4.8]) If T is Σ0n+1-definable and Σ
0
n-sound
extension of PA, then T is not Π0n+1-decisive.
The optimality of this generalization is shown by Salehi and Seraji in [89]:
there exists a Σ0n+1-definable, Σ
0
n−1-sound (n ≥ 1) and complete theory
which contains Q (see Theorem 2.6 in [89]). So it is not true that any
consistent extension of PA is incomplete.
Before Go¨del’s work, it is often thought that for any arithmetic sentence
φ, φ is provable in PA iff φ is true in the standard model of arithmetic. G1
reveals the difference between the notion of provability in PA and the notion
of truth in the standard model. Define Prov = {φ ∈ L(PA) : PA ⊢ φ} and
Truth = {φ ∈ L(PA) : N |= φ}. Tarski proved that Truth is not definable
in N. G1 reveals that there are essential differences between the property of
Truth and Prov: Prov ( Truth (i.e. there is true sentence of arithmetic
which is independent of PA); Truth is not definable in the standard model
N but Prov is definable in N; Truth is not arithmetic but Prov is recursive
enumerable; Truth and Prov both are not recursive and not representable
in PA.13 Moreover, it is a surprising fact that we could use provability logic
to characterize the difference between the notion of provability in PA and
the notion of truth in N as the following theorem shows:
Theorem 3.4 (Solovay). Arithmetical completeness theorem for GL:
For any modal formula φ in L(GL), GL ⊢ φ iff PA ⊢ φf for every
arithmetic interpretation f .14
Arithmetical completeness theorem for GLS: For any modal for-
mula φ,GLS ⊢ φ iff N |= φf for every arithmetic interpretation f .15
Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems are closely related to paradox. Go¨del
commented that “any epistemological antinomy could be used for a simi-
lar proof of the existence of undecidable propositions” (see [35, Note 14]).
13For details of the properties of Truth and Prov, we refer to [73] and [97].
14GL is a modal system consisting of the following schemes of axiom: (1) all tautologies;
(2) ✷(A→ B)→ (✷A→ ✷B); (3) ✷(✷A→ A)→ ✷A; as well as two inference rules: (1)
if ⊢ A and ⊢ A→ B, then ⊢ B; (2) if ⊢ A, then ⊢ ✷A. An arithmetic interpretation is a
function that maps each formula of GL to a sentence in L(PA).
15GLS is a modal system consisting of all theorems ofGL and instances of the following
scheme of axiom: ✷A→ A. However,GLS has only one inference rule: the modus ponens.
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In Go¨del’s proof of G1, he imitated the Liar Paradox to construct a self-
reference sentence called Go¨del’s sentence G which says that G is not prov-
able in PA. A popular misinterpretation of Go¨del’s incompleteness theo-
rems from the non-academic community says that since Go¨del’s proof uses
the Liar Paradox, his proof itself is paradoxical. However, the fact that
we could imitate or formalize a logical paradox to prove incompleteness
theorems does not imply that the incompleteness theorems themselves are
paradoxical. Go¨del’s sentence concerns the notion of provability but the
liar sentence in the Liar Paradox concerns the notion of truth. But there is
a big difference between the notion of provability and truth. Go¨del’s sen-
tence G does not lead to a contradiction as the liar sentence. If G is false,
then G is provable in PA and hence G is true. If G is true, then G is
not provable in PA; if we can infer from this that ¬G is provable in PA,
then we will arrive at a contradiction since in this case G is false. How-
ever, from G is not provable in PA we can not derive that ¬G is provable.
Since PA ⊢ G ↔ ¬PrPA(pGq), if PA ⊢ ¬G, then PA ⊢ PrPA(pGq).
So N |= PrPA(pGq) and hence PA ⊢ G which contradicts the fact that
PA is consistent. Except for the Liar Paradox, many different paradoxes
have been used to give a new proof of incompleteness theorems. For ex-
ample, proofs of Go¨del’s theorems from Berry’s Paradox ([8],[49]); from
Unexpected Examination Paradox ([61]); from Yablo’s Paradox ([17],[62])
and from Grelling-Nelson’s Paradox ([16]), etc. All of these different proofs
of incompleteness theorems via different paradoxes are not paradoxical even
if the proofs use some logical paradoxes.
It is often claimed that the significance of G1 was diminished by the fact
that the undecidable sentence Go¨del constructed has no real mathematical
content: Go¨del’s sentence is of meta-mathematical nature and has no real
mathematical content. However, after Go¨del’s work people have found many
examples of undecidable sentences with real mathematical contents. The
first striking example of a mathematically natural independent statement of
PA with number-theoretical contents was Paris-Harrington principle pro-
posed in [78] which generalizes the finite Ramsey theorem. Besides the
Paris-Harrington principle, there are several mathematically natural inde-
pendent statements of PA with combinatorial contents in the literature: the
Goodstein sequence ([52]), the Hercules-Hydra game ([52]), the Kanamori-
McAloon principle ([48]), the Worm principle ([4],[43]) and others. But
does this phenomenon indicate that there is a gap between mathematics and
meta-mathematics? However, it is interesting that all these naturally combi-
natorial independent principles with real mathematical contents are in fact
provably equivalent in PA to a certain metamathematical sentence. Con-
sider the following reflection principle for Σ01 sentences: for any Σ
0
1 sentence
φ in L(PA), if φ is provable in PA, then φ is true. Using the arithmetization
of syntax, one can write this principle as a sentence of L(PA) and denote
it by RfnΣ01(PA). McAloon proved that PA ⊢ ϕ ↔ RfnΣ01(PA), where
ϕ is the Paris-Harrington principle (similar equivalences can be shown for
the above other independent principles).16 These independent principles are
16Equivalently, all these principles are equivalent to the statement of 1-consistency of
the arithmetic PA. See [3, p.36] and [73, p.301].
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provable in some fragments of second order arithmetic but are more complex
than Go¨del’s sentence: Go¨del’s sentence is equivalent to Con(PA) in PA;
but all these principles are not only independent of PA but also independent
of PA + Con(PA) (see [3, p.36] and [73, p.301]). See [106]-[111] for more
examples and discussions of mathematically independent statements. [10] is
a good survey paper on unprovability theory as of autumn 2006. We refer
to [32] for the new advances in Boolean Relation Theory for more examples
of concrete mathematical incompleteness.
It is well known that for any recursively axiomatizable consistent theory
S, if Q is interpretable in S, then S is incomplete. It is often thought that
Q is the weakest base theory of arithmetic we need for the proof of G1
w.r.t. interpretation. But this is wrong. Let us look at a general question
about the limit of incompleteness: for the proof of G1, exactly how much
information of arithmetic is needed. To precisely reformulate this question,
let us first introduce the notion “G1 holds for T”.
Definition 3.5. G1 holds for T iff for any recursively axiomatizable consis-
tent theory S, if T is interpretable in S, then S is incomplete.
From G1, PA is essentially incomplete and G1 holds for PA. In fact, G1
holds for many subsystems of PA. In the following, I give some such exam-
ples. We know that G1 holds for Robinson’s Q (see [97]). Tarski, Mostowski
and Robinson proved in [97] that if T is a consistent theory in which all
recursive functions are representable, then T is essentially incomplete; and
all recursive functions are representable in R. So R is essentially incomplete
(see [97, theorem 9], p.60). Vaught essentially proved in [100] that G1 holds
for R. Let R0 be the sub-theory of R which consists of axiom schemes R1-
R4. R0 is not essentially incomplete.
17 Let R1 be the system consisting of
schemes R1-R3 and R4′ where R4′ is defined as follows:
∀x(x ≤ n↔ x = 0 ∨ · · · ∨ x = n).
R1 is essentially incomplete since R is interpretable in R1 (see [47], p. 62).
However R1 is not minimal essentially incomplete. Let R2 be the system
consisting of schemes R2,R3 and R4′. From [47], R is interpretable in R2
and hence R2 is essentially incomplete. R2 is minimal essentially incomplete
in the sense that if we delete any axiom scheme of R2, then the remaining
system is not essentially incomplete.18 In a summary, R,R0,R1 and R2 are
mutually interpretable and essentially incomplete.
Visser proved in [102, Theorem 6] that R has the following maximality
property: for any r.e. theory T , T is locally finite iff T is interpretable in
R (see [102, Theorem 6]).19 As a corollary, Q is not interpretable in R and
hence R ✁Q.20 It is often thought that R is the weakest theory for which
17R0 has a decidable complete extension given by the theory of reals with ≤ as the
empty relation on reals.
18If we delete R2, then the theory of natural numbers with x · y defined as x+ y is a
complete decidable extension; if we delete R3, then the theory of models with only one
element is a complete decidable extension; if we delete R4′, then the theory of reals is a
complete decidable extension.
19Theory T is locally finite iff any finite sub-theory of T has a finite model.
20If Q is interpretable in R, then by Visser’s theorem, Q is locally finite. But Q has
no finite model.
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G1 holds w.r.t. interpretation. A natural question is: could we find a theory
S such that G1 holds for S and S ✁ R? Recent progress on this problem
shows that R is not the weakest theory for which G1 holds with respect to
interpretation. In fact, we could find many theory S such that G1 holds for
S and S ✁R.21
4. Some popular misinterpretations of Go¨del’s second
incompleteness theorem
Go¨del announced the second incompleteness theorem (G2) in an abstract
published in October 1930: no consistency proof of systems such as Prin-
cipia, Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, or the systems investigated by Acker-
mann and von Neumann is possible by methods which can be formulated
in these systems (see [113], p.431). For first order theory T , let Con(T )
denote the sentence in the language of arithmetic expressing the consistency
of T under Go¨del’s recursive arithmetization of T . We call Con(T ) the
consistency statement of T . The following is a modern reformulation of G2:
Theorem 4.1. Let T be a recursively axiomatized extension of PA. If T is
consistent, then Con(T ) is not provable in T .
I give two comments on G2. Firstly, note that for any extension T of PA
in L(PA), even if Con(T ) is not provable in T , since T is reflective, Con(S)
is provable in T for any finite sub-theory S of T . Secondly, if T is consistent,
from G1, there is a sentence which is independent of T ; but from G2, we
cannot get that Con(T ) is independent of T . In fact, it is not provable in
PA that if PA is consistent, then Con(PA) is independent of PA.22 So it
is not enough to show that ¬Con(PA) is not provable in PA only assuming
PA is consistent. But we could prove that Con(PA) is independent of PA
by assuming that PA is 1-consistent.23
Now I examine a delicate mistake in the argument which claims that by
an easy application of the compactness theorem we can show that for any
axiomatization of a consistent theory T , T can not prove its own consistency.
Visser presented this argument in [104] as an interesting dialogue between
Alcibiades and Socrates: “Suppose a consistent theory T can prove its own
consistency under some axiomatization. By compactness theorem, there
must be a finitely axiomatized sub-theory S of T such that S already proves
the consistency of T . Since S proves the consistency of T , it must also prove
the consistency of S. So, we have a finitely axiomatized theory which proves
its own consistency. But G2 applies to the finite axiomatization and we have
a contradiction. It follows that T can not prove its own consistency.”
The mistake in this argument is: from the fact that S can prove the
consistency of T we cannot infer that S can prove the consistency of S.
Some may argue that since S is a sub-theory of T and S can prove the
21[14] proves that for any Turing degree 0 < d < 0′, there is a theory U such that G1
holds for U , U✁R and U has Turing degree d where 0′ is the Turing degree of the halting
problem.
22See [9, Theorem 4, p.97] for a modal proof in GL of this fact using the arithmetic
completeness theorem for GL.
23It is an easy fact that if PA is 1-consistent and S is not a theorem of PA, then
PrPA(pSq) is not a theorem of PA.
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consistency of T , then of course S can prove the consistency of S. As Visser
pointed out in [104] that we should carefully distinguish three perspectives
of theory T : our external perspective, the internal perspective of S and the
internal perspective. From each perspective, the consistency of the whole
theory implies the consistency of its sub-theory. From T ’s perspective, S
is a sub-theory of T ; but from S’s perspective, S may not be a sub-theory
of T . From the fact that T knows that S is a sub-theory of T , we cannot
infer that S also knows that S is a sub-theory of T since S is a finitely
sub-theory of T and may not know any information that T knows. I.e.,
the sub-theory relation between theories is not absolute. Moreover, the
notion of consistency is also not absolute. A theory may be consistent from
the external perspective but inconsistent from the internal perspective. For
example, let T = PA + ¬Con(PA). From G2, T is consistent from the
external perspective. But since T ⊢ ¬Con(T ),24 T is not consistent from
the internal perspective of T .
A popular version of G2 says that if a theory is sufficiently strong, then it
does not prove its own consistency. The meaning of this statement is vague.
What does “sufficiently strong” mean? The theory should contain Robin-
son’s Arithmetic Q, a very weak finitely axiomatized theory.25 Now we can
reformulate a general version of G2 in terms of the notion of interpretation:
Theorem 4.2. (General version of G2, Visser [101]) There is no r.e. the-
ory T such that Q+Con(T ) is interpretable in T , i.e. Q+Con(T ) 5 T .26
Bezboruah and Shepherdson proved in [7] that G2 holds for Q: Q 0
Con(Q).27 A natural question is whether G2 holds for other theories weaker
than Q w.r.t. interpretation (for example R). We do know that R does in-
terpret R+Con(R) and Fedor Pakhomov recently produced a more natural
example of the kind.28
It is often thought that Con(T ) expresses that T is consistent. However,
the meaning of Con(T ) as well as Theorem 4.5 and Theorem 4.2 are vague.
Now I examine the vagueness of the consistency statement. Detlefsen argued
that it is possible that the unprovable sentence stating the consistency of
the theory does not really express consistency of the theory (see [19], p.309).
From the philosophical point of view, one could ask: what does it mean
to say that a formal theory does not prove its own consistency? what a
consistency statement of a theory is? when can we reasonably say that
the arithmetic sentence Con(T ) does really express the consistency of T ?
how do we know that there are not entirely different statements, that are
consistency statements and provable (see [101], p.545). These questions are
difficult to answer and have been investigated by many logicians, among
24Note that PA ⊢ PrPA(0 = 1)→ PrPA(PrPA(0 = 1)→ 0 = 1).
25The notion “contain” is also vague: ZF does not contain Q, but Q is interpretable
in ZF.
26In fact, based on ideas of Solovay, Friedman, and Pudla´k, Visser showed in [101] that
for any consistent theory U , we have S12 +Con(U) 5 U where S
1
2 is the weak arithmetic
given in [11].
27This result is a special case of Theorem 4.2; but the method used by Bezboruah and
Shepherdson in [7] is different.
28I would like to thank Prof. Albert Visser to point out this fact to me.
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them Resnik [87], Detlefsen [20], Visser [103] [101], Feferman [24], Auerbach
[2] and Franks [30].
Let CON(T ) denote the statement “T is consistent”. Detlefsen asked in
[20] when and how Con(T ) can plausibly be taken to “express” CON(T ).
We may view Con(T ) as a sort of “replica” of CON(T ). Detlefsen argued
that whether an arithmetic formula expresses the consistency of T depends,
in an essential way, upon what it is that one wants to show about the con-
sistency of T (see [20], p.133). If Con(T ) expresses CON(T ), how should
we understand the “expression” relation between the arithmetic formula
Con(T ) and the ordinary unarithmetized statement CON(T ). Detlefsen
examined the general characterization of the “expression” relationship such
that the replica of CON(T ) really expresses CON(T ). Detlefsen’s philo-
sophical work on the characterization of the expression relation between the
replica of CON(T ) and CON(T ) reveals the intensionability of the concept
of consistency statement.29
Let T be a recursively axiomatized consistent extension of PA. We say
that G2 holds for T if the consistency statement of T is not provable in T .
From the mathematical point of view, the key question is how to eliminate
the vagueness in the consistency statement in a precise way. Firstly, whether
G2 holds for T depends on the definition of provability predicate. We could
define provability predicate in the following general way. We say that a
formula PrfT (x, y) is a proof predicate of T iff it is ∆
0
1 and satisfies the
following conditions:30
(1) For any formula φ, T ⊢ φ if and only if T ⊢ PrfT (pφq, n) for some
natural number n;
(2) T ⊢ ∀x(∃yPrfT (x, y)→ ∀z∃s > zPrfT (x, s));
(3) T ⊢ ∀y(∃xPrfT (x, y)→ ∃!xPrfT (x, y)).
From the proof predicate PrfT (x, y), we could define the provability
predicate PrT (x) as follows: PrT (x) , ∃yPrfT (x, y). From provability
predicate PrT (x), we could define the consistency statement Con(T ) as
¬PrT (p0 = 1q). The derivability condition D1 holds for any provability
predicate. We say a provability predicate is standard if it satisfies condition
D2-D3. Now we give a new reformulation of G2 via the standard provability
predicate.
29Detlefsen pointed out the “replication” is supposed to work as follows (Detlefsen [20],
p.133):“One is interested in determining whether CON(T ) has a certain property F (e.g.,
the property of being finitisically provable, the property of being provable by means of a
gainful proof, and so on). In order to make this determination, one inspects Con(T ) (the
arithmetic “replica”) to see whether it has the property G (e.g., the property of being
provable within T , and so on). In each case, Con(T ) may be said to “express” CON(T )
when one has an appropriate means of transforming a determination of Con(T )’s G-
ness (non-G-ness) into a determination of CON(T )’s F -ness (non-F -ness). This general
characterization of the notion of “expression” is intentionally schematic, leaving open, as
it does, the question of (i) what is to count as “an appropriate means of transforming”,
(ii) what is to count as a “determination”, and (iii) what specific properties are to be
substituted in the places of F and G. Spelling out these variables in different ways will
lead to different versions of the expression relation.”
30We can say that each proof predicate represents the relation “y is a code of a proof
of a formula with Go¨del number x in T”.
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Theorem 4.3. Let T be any recursively enumerable consistent extension of
PA. If PrT (x) is a standard provability predicate, then T 0 Con(T ).
As Visser argued in [103], being a consistency statement is not an absolute
concept but a role w.r.t. a choice of the provability predicate (see Visser
[103]). If PrT (x) is not a standard provability predicate, then Con(T )
maybe provable in T . For example, for the proof predicate PrfPA(x, y),
we could define the Rosser provability predicate PrRPA(x) as the formula
∃y(PrfPA(x, y) ∧ ∀z ≤ y¬PrfPA(¬˙(x), z)), where ¬˙ is a function symbol
expressing a primitive recursive function calculating the code of ¬φ from
the code of φ. However, ConR(PA) , ¬PrRPA(p0 = 1q) is provable in
PA since for any sentence φ, if PA ⊢ ¬φ, then PA ⊢ ¬PrRPA(pφq) (see
[51, Proposition 2.1]). So the Rosser provability predicate at least does not
satisfy one of conditions D2 and D3.31 In the following, we give a more
general definition of provability predicate for T w.r.t. the numeration of T .
Definition 4.4. Let T be any recursively axiomatized consistent extension
of PA and α(x) be a formula in L(T ).
(1) Define the formulaPrfα(x, y) saying “y is the Go¨del number of a proof of
the formula with Go¨del number x from the set of all sentences satisfying
α(x)”.
(2) Define the provability predicatePrα(x) of α(x) asPrα(x) , ∃yPrfα(x, y)
and consistency statement Conα(T ) as , ¬Prα(⊥).
(3) α(x) is a numeration of T if for any n,PA ⊢ α(n) iff n is the Go¨del
number of some φ ∈ T .
Let T be a recursively axiomatized consistent extension of PA. For each
formula α(x), we have:
D2′ PA ⊢ Prα(pϕq) → (Prα(pϕ→ ψq)→ Prα(pψq)).
If α(x) is a numeration of T , then Prα(x) satisfies the following properties
(see [63, Fact 2.2]):
D1′: If T ⊢ ϕ, then PA ⊢ Prα(pϕq);
D3′: If ϕ is Σ01, then PA ⊢ ϕ→ Prα(pϕq);
Now we give a new reformulation of G2 via numerations.
Theorem 4.5. Let T be any recursively enumerable consistent extension of
PA. If α(x) is any Σ01 numeration of T , then T 0 Conα(T ).
It is often thought that G2 has the same status as G1. However, G2 is
essentially different from G1 due to the intensionality of G2. The intension-
ality of G2 says that whether G2 holds for PA depends on the numeration of
PA. G2 holds for Σ01 numerations of PA, but fails for some Π
0
1 numerations
of PA. For example, Feferman constructs in [24] a Π01 numeration π(x) of
PA such that G2 fails: Conpi(PA) , ¬Prpi(p0 = 1q) is provable in PA.
32
31However, we could construct different Rosser provability predicates with different
properties. For example, Guaspari and Solovay constructs in [39] a Rosser provability
predicate which does not satisfy condition D2 and D3; Arai constructs in [1] a Rosser
provability predicate which satisfies conditionD2 and a Rosser provability predicate which
satisfies condition D3.
32Go¨del’s consistency sentence Conτ (PA) is not equivalent with Conpi(PA). But PA
does not know this fact, i.e. PA 0 ¬(Conτ (PA)↔ Conpi(PA)) since PA 0 ¬Conτ (PA).
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Generally, Feferman showed in [24] that if T is a Σ01-definable extension of
PA, then there is a Π01 definition τ(u) of T such that T ⊢ Conτ (T ).
Now we examine the intensionality of G2. The key point of the inten-
sionability of G2 lies in that the property of the provability predicate is
intensional and depends on the numeration of the theory. Under different
numerations of PA, the provability predicate may have different proper-
ties. It may happen that one theory S has two numerations α(x) and β(x)
of S such that Conα(S) is not equivalent to Conβ(S). For example, un-
der Go¨del’s recursive numeration and Feferman’s Π01 numeration of PA, the
corresponding consistency statements are not equivalent. Generally, Kikuchi
and Kurahashi prove in [50, Corollary 5.11] that if T is Σ0n+1-definable and
not Σ0n-sound, then there are Σ
0
n+1 definitions σ1(x) and σ2(x) of T such
that T ⊢ Conσ1(T ) and T ⊢ ¬Conσ2(T ).
Due to the intensionability problem, G2 is not coordinate-free (dependent
on the numerations of PA).33 Visser addressed in [103] the important prob-
lem of formulating G2 in a general way such that it is coordinate-free (inde-
pendent of numerations of PA). One way to eliminate the intensionability
of G2 is to uniquely characterize the consistency statement in some sense.
In [101], Visser proposed the interesting question of uniquely characteriz-
ing the consistency statement. Visser showed in [101] that the consistency
statement can be pinned down as the unique solution of a certain equation
modulo a suitable equivalence relation; especially, consistency for finitely
axiomatized sequential theories can be uniquely characterized modulo EA-
provable equivalence (see [101], p.543). But characterizing the consistency of
infinitely axiomatized r.e. theories is more delicate and a big open problem
in the current research on the intensionability of G2.
Provability logic provides us a new way to examine the intensionability
of the provability predicate. We could view the provability logic as the
logic of the property of the provability predicate. Let T be any recursively
axiomatized consistent extension of PA and α(x) be a numeration of T .
Kurahashi defined in [63] that the provability logic PLα(T ) is the set of all
modal principles which are verifiable in T when the modal operator ✷ is
interpreted as Prα(x).
Theorem 4.6 (Solovay’s arithmetical completeness theorem). ([63, Theo-
rem 2.5]) Let T be any recursively axiomatized consistent extension of PA.
If T is Σ01-sound, then for any Σ
0
1 numeration α(x) of T , the provability logic
PLα(T ) is precisely GL.
However, under Feferman’s Π01 numeration π(x) of PA, since the consis-
tency statement Conpi(PA) defined by using Prpi(x) is provable in PA, the
provability logic PLpi(PA) of Prpi(x) is different from GL. An interesting
research program is to classify the provability logic PLα(T ) according to the
numeration α(x) of T . The provability logic PLτ (T ) of a Σ
0
n numeration
33Halbach and Visser examined the sources of intensionality in the construction of
self referential sentences of arithmetic in [41] [42] and argued that corresponding to the
three stages of the construction of self referential sentences of arithmetic there are at least
three sources of intensionality: coding, expressing a property and self-reference. The three
sources of intensionality are not independent of each other, and a choice made at an earlier
stage will have influences on the availability of choices at a later stage.
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τ(x) of T is a normal modal logic. A natural question is: which normal
modal logic is a provability logic PLτ (T ) of some Σ
0
n numeration τ(x) of
T ? Kurahashi proved in [63] that for any recursively axiomatized consis-
tent extension T of PA, there exists a Σ02 numeration α(x) of T such that
the provability logic PLα(T ) is K; Kurahashi proved in [64] that for each
n ≥ 2, there exists a Σ02 numeration τ(x) of T such that the provability
logic PLτ (T ) coincides with modal logic K + (
np → p) → p; Kura-
hashi proved in [65] that there exists a Rosser provability predicate whose
provability logic is exactly the normal modal logic KD.34 These provability
logics based on different provability predicates reveal the intensionability of
the provability predicate and G2.
It is often thought that D1-D3 are the sufficient and necessary conditions
to show that G2 holds for PA. But this is not true. From Definition 4.4,
conditions D1-D2 hold for any numeration of PA. Whether the provability
predicate satisfies the condition D3 depends on the numeration of PA. For
any Σ01-numeration α(x) of PA, the condition D3 holds for Prα(x). In [63],
Taishi Kurahashi constructed a Σ02-numeration of axioms of PA such that
the provability logic for that numeration is precisely K. Since K 0 ¬⊥,
as a corollary, under Taishi’s Σ02-numeration α(x) of PA, G2 holds for PA:
Conα(PA) , ¬Prα(p0 = 1q) is not provable in PA. But the Lo¨b condition
D3 does not hold since K 0 A → A. This gives us an example of a
Σ02 numeration α(x) of PA such that D3 does not hold for Prα(x) but G2
holds for PA. So D1-D3 are the sufficient condition but not the necessary
condition to show that G2 holds for PA.
It is often said that G2 holds for any consistent extension of PA. In fact,
this is not true. From G2, if T is a Σ01-definable and consistent extension of
PA, then T 0 Conσ(T ) for any Σ01 definition σ(u) of T . G2 is generalized
in [18] by showing that any Σ0n+1-definable and Σ
0
n-sound extension of PA
cannot prove its own Σ0n-soundness (see [18, Theoerem 2]). The optimality
of the generalization is shown by presenting a Σ0n+1-definable and Σ
0
n−1-
sound extension of PA that proves its own Σ0n−1-soundness for any n > 0
(see [18, Theoerem 3]).
One folklore misinterpretation of G1 and G2 is that there are arithmetic
truths which can not be proved in any formal theory in the language of
arithmetic. However, this interpretation is false from Turing’s work in [99]
and Feferman’s work in [25]. Turing’s work in [99] shows that any true Π01-
sentence of arithmetic can be provable in some transfinite iteration of PA;
and Feferman’s work in [25] extends Turing’s work to any true sentence
of arithmetic. Our following presentation of Turing and Feferman’s work
follows closely [91] (see [91], p.285-290).
Now we define the transfinite iteration of PA. Given theory A, let A∗
consist of the axioms of A together with every instance of the following
reflection principle
∀xPrA(pφ(x˙)q)→ ∀xφ(x)
where PrA(pφ(x˙)q) is a formula stating that the result of substituting the
appropriate numeral for x in φ(x) is provable in A. Let A(0) = PA; for
34KD = K+ ¬✷⊥.
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each ordinal α, if A(α) is defined, in Turing’s work let A(α + 1) = A(α) +
Con(A(α)) and in Feferman’s work let A(α + 1) = A(α)∗. If α is a limit
ordinal, then let A(α) =
⋃
β<αA(β). Let us consider the transfinite sequence
of theories 〈A(α) : α ∈ Ord〉. However, the theory A(α + 1) is not well-
defined since the consistency statement and the above reflection principle is
intensional: if B is a theory, then the sentence Con(B) and the theory B∗
depend not just on the theorems of B, but on how B is given. At stage α+1,
we need not just theorems of A(α) but also a description of those theorems,
and this depends on a description of α. If we have two different descriptions
of α, we can end up with two different theories A(α+ 1). To overcome this
problem, we use notations for recursive ordinals. Ordinals can be denoted
by natural numbers.35 Let O be the set of natural numbers that denote
ordinals on this notation. If m ∈ O, let |m| be the ordinal denoted by m.
Let R(1) be a standard enumeration of the theorems of A(0). If n ∈ O,
then let R(2n) be an enumeration of the result of applying the consistency
statement to R(n) (under that description). If e is the Go¨del number of a
Turing machine that enumerates numbers denoting an increasing sequence
S of ordinals, then let R(3 · 5e) be an uniform enumeration of the union of
the sets R(s) for s ∈ S. Note that for each n ∈ O, R(n) is the theory A(|n|)-
under that description. The notation makes the intentionality explicit, since
the theorems of R(n) depend not just on |n| but also on n.
Turing [99] plans to overcome incompleteness by using theories like R(n),
with n ranging over O. He showed that if φ is a true Π01-sentence of arith-
metic, then there is an n ∈ O which can be found effectively from φ such
that |n| = ω+1 and φ belongs to the theorems of R(n).36 In [25], Feferman
extended Turing’s work with his reflection principle A∗ and showed that for
any true sentence of arithmetic, there is a number n ∈ O such that φ belongs
to the theorems of R(n) and hence Truth ⊆
⋃
n∈OR(n). So for any true
sentence φ of arithmetic, there is a way to iterate the reflection principle
and decide φ.
One folklore interpretation of G2 is that since the consistency of PA
cannot be proved in PA, the consistency of PA can only be proved in
a stronger theory extending PA. This interpretation is wrong. Gentzen
constructed a theory T (primitive recursive arithmetic with the additional
principle of quantifier-free transfinite induction up to the ordinal ǫ0)
37 and
proved that the consistency of PA is provable over the theory T. Gentzen’s
theory T contains Q but does not contain PA since T does not prove the
ordinary mathematical induction for all formulas. Since Gentzen’s theory
T contains Q and proves Con(PA), T interprets Q + Con(PA). By the
arithmetized completeness theorem, Q + Con(PA) interprets PA. Hence
Gentzen’s theory T interprets PA. But PA does not interpret Gentzen’s
theory T since by Pudla´k’s result, no consistent theory T that contains
35The number 1 denotes the ordinal 0. If n denotes an ordinal α, then 2n denotes its
successor α+ 1. If e is the Go¨del number of a Turing machine that enumerates numbers
denoting an increasing sequence of ordinals, then 3 · 5e denotes the limit of that sequence.
36This astounding result shows that there is a way to iterate the Go¨del construction
on theories, beginning with PA, so that when we collect together the finite iterations and
take one more Go¨del sentence, φ is decided.
37ǫ0 is the first ordinal α such that ω
α = α.
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Robinson arithmeticQ can interpretQ+Con(T ). SoPA✁T. I.e. Gentzen’s
theory T is stronger than PA w.r.t. interpretation.
The driving goal in the original Hilbert’s program was to justify the im-
plicit or explicit assumption of the “actual infinite” in mathematics by a
reduction to purely finitary concepts and reasonings. A proof-theoretic re-
duction of a theory T to a theory S shows that, as far as a certain class of
propositions is concerned, if T proves a proposition, then S proves it too
and the proof of this fact is itself finitary (see [26], p.364). Hilbert’s pro-
gram can then be seen to be a search for a proof-theoretic reduction of all
of mathematics to finitary mathematics.38 G2 shows that it is impossible
to reduce all of infinitistic mathematics to finitistic mathematics: to prove
consistency of PA one needs stronger methods than those available in PA.
There are extensive literatures about the development of Hilbert’s program
and its effect on mathematical logic (especially proof theory) and philoso-
phy of mathematics (see Feferman [26], Franks [30], Murawski [73], Simpson
[93], Zach [113]). Here, I will only give a brief summary of the status of the
question from the literature: whether G2 refutes Hilbert’s program?
In the rest of this section, I will examine the following popular view of
G2: G2 rejects Hilbert’s program since it demolished the goal of proving
the consistency of mathematics by finitistic reasoning in Hilbert’s program.
This failure of Hilbert’s program due to G2 is apparent if all finitary ar-
guments can be formalized in PA.39 In the literature, some argued that
it is not the case that G2 showed the failure of Hilbert’s program. In [19],
Detlefsen sketched an argument against the claim that G2 implies the failure
of Hilbert’s Program for finding a finitistic consistency proof for the various
theories of classic mathematics. The central claim of the argument is that
Con(T ), the consistency formula shown to be unprovable in T by G2, does
not really “express” consistency in the sense of that term germane to an
evaluation of Hilbert’s Program (see [19], p.309). Furthermore, Detlefsen
convincingly pointed out in [19] (see [19], p.310): “G2, then, only seems to
imply the failure of Hilbert’s Program so long as one ignores the fact that
the logic of the finitistic proof theory of the classical T and the logic of the
classical T itself are two quite different logics! Once this is recognized, the
fact that Con(T ) is not provable in T should come as no particular shock
to those espousing Hilbert’s Program. If the logic of T is expanded in a way
that produces a scheme whose logic is in agreement with the logic of the fini-
tistic proof theory of the classical T , then in at least some instances, Con(T )
38See Feferman [26] for a good survey of proof-theoretical results stemming from
Hilbert’s program which are closely tied to various reductive foundational aims: reducing
the countable infinite to the finitary; reducing the uncountable infinite to the countable
infinite; reducing the impredicative to the predicative and reducing the nonconstructive
to the constructive.
39Note that the failure of Hilbert’s program for a certain formalized system of arith-
metic need not be a failure of Hilbert’s program for elementary number theory if elemen-
tary number theory can be formalized in a system (much weaker than PA) which can be
justified on finitist grounds. Research in reverse mathematics shows that elementary num-
ber theory in ordinary mathematics, as well as substantial tracts of algebra and analysis,
can be developed in a theory proof-theoretically reducible to primitive recursive arithmetic
(PRA) which is generally accepted as finitary reasoning.
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becomes provable. The basic flaw of those using G2 to thwart Hilbert’s Pro-
gram is that they fail to recognize that the logic of the arithmetized proof
theory of T in G2 (since that arithmetized proof theory is itself embedded
in T ) is the logic of T itself, not the logic of the finitistic proof theory of T
(which logic is not a subsystem of T ’s logic)!”
It is difficult to answer the question of whether there are finitary consis-
tency proofs of PA, mainly because there is no generally accepted formal
characterization of the informal concept of finitary proof. If we regard fini-
tary mathematics as being formalizable in PA, then it is not possible to give
finitary proofs of the consistency of PA. However, Go¨del’s work in [34] left
open the possibility that there could be finitary methods which are not for-
malizable in these systems and which would yield the required consistency
proofs. Go¨del himself suggested the possibility of giving finitary consistency
proofs by adopting the principle of transfinite induction on certain primi-
tive recursive well-orderings, which cannot be formalized in PA, but can be
treated as finitistic (see [73], p.309-310). So Go¨del adopts a more liberal
view of what finitary methods might be allowed. It seems that Bernays
was among the first to recognize the need for a generalization of Hilbert’s
program by loosening the requirement of reduction to finitary methods, al-
lowing reduction to constructive methods more generally. This is evidenced
by his remark (see [26], p.365): “it thus became apparent that the finitary
argument is not the only alternative to classical ways of reasoning and is
not necessarily implied by the idea of proof theory. An enlarging of the
methods of proof theory was therefore suggested: instead of a reduction to
finitist methods of reasoning, it was required only that the arguments be
of a constructive character, allowing us to deal with more general forms of
inference.” The problem with such extended forms of Hilbert’s program is
that there are many different styles of constructivity,40 and the concept of
constructivity in general is much less clear even than that of finitism (see
[26], p.366). Go¨del and Bernays’s ideas are realized by Gerhard Gentzen
who proved the consistency of PA by introducing the principle of induction
up to the ordinal ξ0. The only part of Gentzen’s proof that was not clearly
finitary was the transfinite induction up to the ordinal ξ0. If this transfinite
induction is accepted as a finitary method, then one can assert that there is
a finitary proof of the consistency of PA. The fact that induction up to ξ0
establishes the consistency of PA, together with Gentzen’s result that for all
α < ξ0, PA proves the principle of induction up to the ordinal α constitutes
an ordinal analysis of PA, and we say that ξ0 is the proof theoretic ordinal
of PA (see [113], p.436). Gentzen’s work opened a new and productive di-
rection to develop Hilbert’s program: finding the means necessary to prove
the consistency of a given theory. More powerful subsystems of second order
arithmetic have been given consistency proofs by Gaisi Takeuti and others,
and the theories that have been proved consistent by these methods are
quite strong and include most ordinary mathematics. Especially, Feferman
40 There are many forms of constructivism. These include the program of intuition-
ism founded by Brouwer, the finitism of Hilbert and Bernays, the constructive recursive
mathematics of Shanin and Markov, and Bishop’s program of constructive analysis. Con-
structivism also includes the study of constructive set theories such as CZF and the study
of topos theory.
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has argued in [26] that most of mathematics needed for physics, for exam-
ple, can be reduced to predicative systems which can be proof-theoretically
characterized using ordinal notation systems albeit longer than ξ0, but still
of a small or manageable length.
Although the impact of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems for Hilbert’s
program was recognized soon after its publication, Hilbert’s program was
by no means abandoned. The program of so-called reverse mathematics
developed by Friedman and Simpson contributes to providing us with a par-
tial realization of Hilbert’s original program. Despite Go¨del’s theorem, one
can give a finitistic reduction for a substantial portion of infinitistic math-
ematics including many of the best-known nonconstructive theorems (see
[93]). Reverse mathematics is a highly developed research program whose
purpose is to investigate the role of strong set existence axioms in ordinary
mathematics. In the face of Go¨del’s results showing that not all of classical
mathematics can be reduced to and justified by finitistic mathematics, one
can ask: how much of classical mathematics can be so reduced? Reverse
mathematics seeks to give a precise answer to this question by investigat-
ing which set existence axioms are needed in order to prove theorems of
ordinary mathematics. Most of the work on reverse mathematics have been
carried out in the context of subsystems of second order arithmetic (Z2).
41
The usual pattern of mathematical reasoning is to deduce a theorem from
some axioms. This might be called ”forward mathematics”. But in order to
establish that the axioms are necessary for a proof of the theorem, reverse
mathematics reverses the process and deduces the axioms from the theorem.
Most of theorems of ordinary mathematics can be stated in the language of
Z2 and proved in some subsystems of Z2.
42 For many specific theorems T ,
it turns out that there is a weakest natural subsystem of Z2 in which T is
provable. Moreover, this weakest subsystem of Z2 is often one of five specific
subsystems of Z2: RCA0, WKL0, ACA0, ATR0 and Π
1
1-CA0.
43
In a word, even if G2 struck Hilbert’s program and revealed several dif-
ficulties in attempts to realize it, it is hard to say that G2 refutes Hilbert’s
program or Hilbert’s program is killed by G2. Hilbert’s program has in-
spired various investigations in foundations and philosophy of mathematics,
and it can be partially realized. For example, ordinal analysis, functional
interpretations, proof theoretic reductions and reverse mathematics are the
prominent areas most explicitly situated in the tradition of Hilbert’s pro-
gram (see [113], p.440). As Zach concluded, although Go¨del’s theorems show
that Hilbert’s original expectations about what exactly can be analyzed in
which way and with what restricted methods can not be fulfilled, Hilbert’s
41In recent years, the program of reverse mathematics has been extended from analysis
of ordinary mathematics in Z2 to higher order arithmetic. For works on higher order
reverse mathematics, we refer to works by Kohlenbach [57][58], Normann and Sanders
[76] [77].
42However, some important theorems about reals can be stated in Z2 but they are not
provable in Z2 (see [15], [57], [76], [77]).
43RCA0 is the weakest of these specific systems and the others are listed in order of
increasing strength. For the details of these five systems, we refer to the standard textbook
[94].
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aims and proof theory more generally have been advanced tremendously
over the last half-century (see [113], p.441).
5. Go¨del’s theorem and the mechanism thesis
A popular interpretation of G1 is that it tells us that the mind cannot
be mechanized in the sense that the mathematical outputs of the idealized
human mind outstrip the mathematical outputs of any idealized finite ma-
chine.44 The mechanism thesis claims that the mind can be mechanized in
our specific sense. It is well known that Turing proposed a convincing anal-
ysis of the vague and informal notion of “being computable by an idealized
finite machine” in terms of the precise mathematical notion of “being com-
putable by a Turing machine”. So we can replace the vague notion of “an
idealized finite machine” with the mathematically precise notion of a Turing
machine. In this paper, I will not examine the broad question of whether
the mind can be mechanized, which has been extensively discussed in the
literature;45 instead I will only examine the question of whether G1 implies
that the mind cannot be mechanized in the sense that the mathematical
outputs of the idealized human mind outstrip the mathematical outputs of
any Turing machine. In the following, I give a concise overview of the cur-
rent progress on this question based on Koellner’s work in [54],[55] and [56].
For more detailed discussion of the question of whether the mind can be
mechanized, we refer to Koellner’s recent nice survey in [55] and [56].
Go¨del did not argue that his incompleteness theorems imply that the
mind cannot be mechanized understood in our specific sense; instead he ar-
gued that the incompleteness theorems imply a weaker conclusion: Go¨del’s
Disjunction (GD). The first disjunct says that the mind cannot be mech-
anized and the second disjunct says that there are absolutely undecidable
statements in the sense that mathematical truth outstrips the idealized hu-
man mind (or there are mathematical truths that cannot be proved by the
idealized human mind). GD says that either the first disjunct or the second
disjunct holds.46 GD concerns the limit of mathematical knowledge and the
possibility of the existence of mathematical truths that are inaccessible to
the idealized human mind. The first disjunct expresses an aspect of the
power of the idealized human mind, while the second disjunct expresses an
aspect of its limitations.47
44In this paper, we will not consider the performance of actual human minds, with
their limitations and defects; but only consider the idealized human mind and look at
what it can do in principle. See [55], p.2.
45See Penrose [80], Chalmers [13], Lucas [71], Lindstro¨m [69], Feferman [29], Shapiro
[91] [92] and Koellner [54] [55][56].
46The original version of GD was introduce by Go¨del in [37], p. 310: “So the following
disjunctive conclusion is inevitable: either mathematics is incompletable in this sense,
that its evident axioms can never be comprised in a finite rule, that is to say, the human
mind (even within the realm of pure mathematics) infinitely surpasses the powers of any
finite machine, or else there exist absolutely unsolvable diophantine problems of the type
specified (where the case that both terms of the disjunction are true is not excluded, so
that there are, strictly speaking, three alternatives)”.
47We refer to [45], a recent comprehensive research volume about GD, for more discus-
sions of the status of GD.
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What about Go¨del’s view toward the first disjunct and the second dis-
junct? For Go¨del, the first disjunct is true and the second disjunct is false;
that is the mind cannot be mechanized and human mind is sufficiently pow-
erful to capture all mathematical truths. Go¨del believes that the distinc-
tiveness of the human mind when compared to a Turing machine is evident
in its ability to come up with new axioms and develop new mathematical
theories. Go¨del shared Hilbert’s belief expressed in 1926 in the words: “in
mathematics there is no ignoramuses, we should know and we must know”.
Based on his rationalistic optimism, Go¨del believed that we are arithmeti-
cally omniscient and the second disjunct is false.48 However, Go¨del admits
that he cannot give a convincing argument for either the first disjunct or the
second disjunct. Go¨del thought that the most he could claim to have estab-
lished was the disjunctive conclusionGDFor Go¨del, GD is a “mathematically
established fact” of great philosophical interest which follows from his in-
completeness theorems, and it is “entirely independent from the standpoint
taken toward the foundation of mathematics” (Go¨del, [37]).49
LetK be the set of sentences in L(PA) that the idealized human mind can
know. Go¨del refers to Truth as objective mathematics and K as subjective
mathematics. We assume throughout this paper thatK ⊆ Truth. However,
from G1, we have Prov  K since we can show that PA is consistent and
hence Go¨del’s sentence is a true sentence of arithmetic but not provable in
PA.50
GD concerns the concepts of relative provability, absolute provability, and
truth. Before our analysis of GD, let us first examine two key notions about
provability: relative provability and absolute provability. The notion of
relative provability is well understood and we have a precise definition of
relative provability in a formal system. But the notion of absolute provability
is much more ambiguous and we have no unambiguous formal definition of
absolute provability as far as I know. The notion of absolute provability is
intended to be intensionally different from the notion of relative provability
in that absolute provability is not conceptually connected to a formal system.
In contrast to the notion of relative provability, there is little agreement on
what principles of the notion “absolute provability” should be adopted. In
this paper, we equal the notion of “relatively provable with respect to a given
formal system F” with the notion of “producible by a Turing machine M”
(whereM is the Turing machine corresponding to F )51 and equal the notion
of “absolute provability” with the notion of “what the idealized human mind
48For more discussions of the status of the second disjunct, we refer to Leon and Philip’s
recent comprehensive research volume [45].
49In the literature there is a consensus that Go¨del’s argument for GD is definitive, but
until now we have no compelling evidence for or against any of the two disjuncts (Horsten
and Welch, [45]).
50Let us take Fermat’s last theorem for another example. People have shown that
Fermat’s last theorem is a true sentence of arithmetic but, as far as I know, it is still an
open problem whether Fermat’s last theorem is provable in PA. So Fermat’s last theorem
belongs to K but it is open whether it belongs to Prov.
51Note that sentences relatively provable with respect to a given formal system F can
be enumerated by a Turing machine.
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can know”.52 Under this assumption, K is just the set of sentences that are
absolutely provable.
Let 〈Me : e ∈ N〉 be an enumeration of Turing machines and Th(Me)
be the theory enumerated by the Turing machine Me. In this paper, we
assume without loss of generality that Q ⊆ Th(Me) such that both G1 and
G2 apply to Th(Me). We say that a statement φ is relatively undecidable
w.r.t theory Th(Me) for some e if neither φ ∈ Th(Me) nor ¬φ ∈ Th(Me).
We say that a statement φ is absolutely undecidable if φ /∈ K nor ¬φ /∈ K.
We say that theory Th(Me) is consistent if Th(Me) ⊆ Truth. Let us first
examine what the incompleteness theorems tell us about the relationship
between Th(Me),K and Truth.
G1 tells us that for any sufficiently strong consistent theory F containing
PA, there are statements which are relatively undecidable with respect to
F . But as Go¨del argued, these statements are not absolutely undecidable;
instead one can always pass to higher systems in which the sentence in
question is provable (see [38], p.35). For example, from G2, Con(PA) is
not provable in PA; but Con(PA) is provable in second order arithmetic
(Z2).
53 Since G2 applies to Z2, the Π
1
0-truth Con(Z2) is not provable in
Z2. But Con(Z2) is provable in Z3 (third order arithmetic) which captures
the Π10-truth that was missed by Z2. This pattern continues up through the
orders of arithmetic and up through the hierarchy of set-theoretic systems;
at each stage a missing Π10-truth is captured at the next stage (see [55], p.
13).
Now let us first examine the question whether the incompleteness the-
orems show that GD holds. From the literature, we have found a natural
framework EAT in which we can establish definitive results of the form:
if the principles governing the fundamental concepts of relative provability,
absolute provability and truth are such-and-such, then one can give a rig-
orous proof of GD, vindicating Go¨del’s claim that GD is a mathematically
established fact.
Now I introduce two systems of epistemic arithmetic: EA and EAT. For
the presentation of EA and EAT, I follow closely from [54] and [55]. The
first is designed to deal with Th(Me) and K, and the second is designed
to deal with Th(Me),K and Truth. For EAT, we only require a typed
truth predicate.54 The basic system EA of epistemic arithmetic has axioms
of arithmetic and axioms of absolute provability, and the extended system
EAT has additional axioms of typed truth.
55 In EA and EAT, K is treated
52Williamson [112] makes the similar definition that a mathematical hypothesis is ab-
solutely decidable if and only if either it or its negation can in principle be known by a
normal mathematical process; otherwise it is absolutely undecidable.
53Recall that Con(PA) refers to the consistency statement of PA under a recursive
numeration of PA.
54A typed truth predicate is one that applies only to statements that do not them-
selves involve the truth predicate. In contrast, a type-free truth predicate is one which
also applies to statements that themselves involve the truth predicate. The principles
governing typed truth predicates are perfectly straightforward and uncontroversial, while
the principles governing type-free truth predicates are much more delicate. See [55], p.18.
55These systems were first introduced by Myhill [74], Reinhardt [85][84][86], and
Shapiro [90], and then investigated by many others (e.g. Horsten [44], Leitgeb [66], Rein-
hardt [84][85][86], Carlson [12], Koellner [54][55] and others).
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as an operator rather than a predicate.56 The basic axioms of absolute
provability are:57
K1: Universal closures of formulas of the form Kφ where φ is a first-
order validity.
K2: Universal closures of formulas of the form (K(φ → ψ) ∧Kφ) →
Kψ.
K3: Universal closures of formulas of the form Kφ→ φ.
K4: Universal closures of formulas of the form Kφ→ KKφ.58
The language L(EA) is L(PA) expanded to include an operator K that
takes formulas of L(EA) as arguments. The axioms of arithmetic are simply
those of PA, only now the induction scheme is taken to cover all formulas
in L(EA). For a collection Γ of formulas in L(EA), let KΓ denote the
collection of formulas Kφ where φ ∈ Γ. The system EA is the theory
axiomatized by Σ∪KΣ, where Σ consists of the axioms ofPA in the language
L(EA) and the basic axioms of absolute provability. The language L(EAT)
of EAT is the language L(EA) augmented with a unary predicate T . The
system EAT is the theory axiomatized by Σ ∪ KΣ, where Σ consists of
the axioms of PA in the language L(EAT), the basic axioms of absolute
provability (in the language L(EAT)), and the Tarskian axioms of truth for
the language L(EA).
From the incompleteness theorems, Go¨del made the following two claims
about the relationship between Th(Me),K and Truth.
Claim One: For any e ∈ N, K(Th(Me) ⊆ Truth)→ Th(Me) $ K.59
Claim Two: Either ¬∃e(Th(Me) = K) or ∃φ(φ ∈ Truth ∧ φ /∈ K ∧
¬φ /∈ K).60
Go¨del’s Claim One is formalizable and provable in EAT. In fact, some-
thing stronger is provable in EA as the following theorems show:
Theorem 5.1. (Reinhardt, [84]). Assume that S includes EA. Suppose
F(x) is a formula with one free variable.
(1) If for each sentence φ, S ⊢ K(F (pφq) → φ). Then there is a sentence
ϕ such that S ⊢ Kϕ ∧K¬F (pϕq).
(2) If for each sentence φ, S ⊢ K(Kφ→ F (pφq)). Then S ⊢K¬K(Con(F )).
56From results in Go¨del [36], Myhill [74], Montague [72], Thomason [98], and others, if
one formulates a theory of absolute provability with K as a predicate then inconsistency
may come. See [55], p.19.
57The basic conditions we will impose on knowability are: (1) if the idealized human
mind knows φ and φ → ψ then the idealized human mind knows ψ; (2) if the idealized
human mind knows φ then φ is true; (3) if the idealized human mind knows φ then the
idealized human mind knows that the idealized human mind knows φ.
58K1-known as logical omniscience-says that K holds of all first-order logical validities;
K2 says thatK is closed under modus ponens, and so distributes across logical derivations;
K3 says that K is correct; and K4 says that K is absolutely self-reflective.
59The informal proof of Claim One is as follows: Suppose K(Th(Me) ⊆ Truth). Since
it is knowable that Th(Me) is consistent, it is knowable that there is a true sentence of
arithmetic which is not provable in Th(Me). So Th(Me) $ K.
60The informal proof of Claim Two is as follows: Suppose Th(Me) = K for some e.
Since Th(Me) is R.E. but Truth is not arithmetic, K $ Truth. So we can find some
φ ∈ Truth but φ /∈ K and ¬φ /∈ K.
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GD is also formalizable and provable inEAT which confirms Go¨del’s claim
that GD is a mathematically established fact.61
Theorem 5.2. (Reinhardt, [86]). Assume EAT. Then GD holds.
There has been a massive amount of literature on the arguments for the
first disjunct due primarily to Lucas and Penrose (see Lucas [70], Penrose
[80]) which claim that G1 shows that the human mind cannot be mecha-
nized.62 Most philosophers and logicians believe that variants of the argu-
ments of Lucas and Penrose are not fully convincing. In this paper, we focus
on the following question: whether the first disjunct is also a mathematically
established fact from Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems.
The main point of Lucas’s argument is as follows: from G1, for any formal
system T containing large enough fragment of PA, we can construct Go¨del’s
sentence G such that G is not provable in T ; but it is knowable that G is
true. So the human mind cannot be mechanized. This argument is invalid, in
general we do not know whetherG is true, we only know that G is true iff T
is consistent, but Con(T )→ G is also provable in T .63 Benacerraf correctly
pointed out in [5] that Lucas’ argument does not exclude the possibility
that the human mathematical mind is indeed a Turing machine, but it is
not humanly knowable which one it is.
Following Reinhardt, we should distinguish three levels of the mechanistic
thesis. (1) The weak mechanistic thesis (WMT): ∃e(K = Th(Me)); (2) The
strong mechanistic thesis (SMT): K∃e(K = Th(Me)); (3) The super strong
mechanistic thesis (SSMT): ∃eK(K = Th(Me)). WMT is just the first
disjunct which says that there is a Turing machine which coincides with the
idealized human mind in the sense that the two have the same outputs. SMT
says that the idealized human mind knows that there is a Turing machine
which coincides with the idealized human mind. SSMT says that there is a
particular Turing machine such that the idealized human mind knows that
that particular machine coincides with the idealized human mind.
Suppose WMT holds. Then K = Th(Me) for some e. But K can be
enumerated by which machine? Let A = {e : K = Th(Me)}. Then A is not
recursive by Rice theorem.64 So there is no effective procedure such that
given e we could decide whether K = Th(Me) or not, even if we know that
K = Th(Me) for some e.
The following theorem shows that we can prove in EAT that there does
not exist a particular Turing machine such that the idealized human mind
61It is a little delicate to formalize GD in EAT since K is formalized as an operator
in EAT and so we are prohibited from quantifying into it. For the details, we refer to
Reinhardt [86] and Koellner [55][54].
62The arguments for the first disjunct began with Nagel and Newman in [75] and con-
tinued with Lucas’s publication in [70]. Nagel and Newman’s argument was criticized by
Putnam in [83], while Lucas’s argument was much more widely criticized in the literature.
See Feferman [29] for a historical account and Benacerraf [5] for an influential criticism of
Lucas.
63Putnam [83] correctly pointed out this and asked how can Lucas show that T is
consistent.
64Let C be any class of partial recursive functions. Rice theorem says that {n : φn ∈ C}
is recursive if and only if C = ∅ or C is the class of all partial recursive functions where
φn is the partial recursive function with index n.
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knows that that particular Turing machine coincides with the idealized hu-
man mind.
Theorem 5.3. (Reinhardt, [84]) EAT + SSMT is inconsistent.
The following theorem shows that, from the viewpoint of EAT it is pos-
sible that the idealized human mind is in fact a Turing machine. From
Theorem 5.3, it just cannot know which one.65
Theorem 5.4. (Reinhardt [85]) EAT +WMT is consistent.
Theorem 5.4 shows that the first disjunct is not provable in EAT. Since
EAT seems to embody all of the assumptions held by the proponents of the
first disjunct, this shows that there is a fundamental obstacle to prove the
first disjunct (see [55], p.28). But Go¨del did think that one day we would
be in a position to prove the first disjunct, and what was missing, as he
saw it, was an adequate resolution of the paradoxes involving self-applicable
concepts like the concept of truth. Go¨del thought that “[i]f one could clear
up the intensional paradoxes somehow, one would get a clear proof that
mind is not machine”.66
The following technical theorem from Carlson shows that, from the point
of view of EAT, it is possible that the idealized human mind knows that it
is a Turing machine: it just cannot know which one.
Theorem 5.5. (Carlson, [12]) EAT + SMT is consistent.
Now I give a summary for the question whether Go¨del’s incomplete-
ness theorems imply the first disjunct. The incompleteness theorems im-
ply that ¬∃eK(K = Th(Me)). But from Theorem 5.4, it does not follow
that ¬∃e(K = Th(Me)); and from Theorem 5.5, it does not even follow
that ¬K∃e (K = Th(Me)). The difference between ∃eK and K∃e before
K = Th(Me) is essential. Assuming the principles embodied in EAT, it is
possible to know that we are a Turing machine (i.e. K∃e(K = Th(Me)));
it is just not possible for there to be a Turing machine such that we know
that we are that Turing machine (i.e. ∃eK(K = Th(Me))).
Penrose proposed a new argument for the first disjunct in [81] and [82].
Penrose’s new argument is the most sophisticated and promising argument
for the first disjunct which has been extensively discussed and carefully ana-
lyzed in the literature (see Chalmers [13], Feferman [27], Lindstro¨m [68][69],
and Shapiro [91][92], Gaifman [33] and Koellner [54][56], etc). The question
of whether Penrose’s new argument establishes the first disjunct is quite
subtle. Penrose’s new argument involves treating truth as type-free, and so
for the analysis and formalization of Penrose’s argument, we need to employ
type-free notions of truth. However, we now have many type-free theories
of truth and there is no consensus as to which option is best.
In the literature, we have found a framework DTK which employs Fefer-
man’s type-free theory of determinate truthDT and some additional axioms
governing K to the axioms of DT.67 From [54] and [56], DTK is consistent
65This result gives a precise mathematical formulation to the possibility raised by
Benacerraf [5].
66This quotation is from Hao Wang’s reconstruction of his conversations with Go¨del.
See Wang [105], p. 187.
67For the details of the system DT and DTK, see [54] and [56].
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(see [54, Theorem 7.14.1]) and DTK proves GD (see [54, Theorem 7.15.3]).
However, the particular argument Penrose gives for the first disjunct fails in
the context of DTK (see [56, Theorem 4.1]). Moreover, even if we restrict
the first and second disjunct to arithmetic statements, DTK can neither
prove nor refute either the first disjunct or the second disjunct (see [54,
Theorem 7.16.1-7.16.2]). From the point of view of DTK, it is in principle
impossible to prove or refute either disjunct. Koellner argued that “these re-
sults may indicate that the concepts of absolute provability and knowability
by the idealized human mind are not sharp enough for our questions whether
the mind is not mechanized and whether there are absolutely undecidable
problems to have definite sense and determinate truth values” (Koellner,
[56], p.31).68
In our previous discussions about GD, the first disjunct and the second
disjunct, we equate absolutely undecidability with knowability of the ide-
alized human mind and define that φ is absolutely undecidable if φ /∈ K
and ¬φ /∈ K. Under this framework, the second disjunct is equivalent to
“K is not complete”. Under the assumption that K ⊆ Truth, the second
disjunct is equivalent to “K ( Truth”. However, G1 only tells us that
Prov ( Truth, and it does not tell us that K ( Truth. Another natural
informal definition of absolutely undecidability is: φ is absolutely undecid-
able if there is no consistent extension T of ZFC with well-justified axioms
such that φ is provable in T . In this paper, we focus on whether the incom-
pleteness theorems imply the second disjunct. In philosophy of set theory,
there are extensive discussions about wether there exists an absolutely un-
decidable statement in set theory. For the detailed discussions about the
question of absolutely undecidability in set theory and especially whether
CH is absolutely undecidable, we refer to Koellner [53].
We have shown that the popular view that G1 implies the first disjunct
(mind cannot be mechanized) is problematic and not convincing. In the
following, I introduce an effective version of G1 and examine whether this
version of G1 refutes the first disjunct.
A general version of G1 says that for any recursive enumerable A ⊆
Truth, there is a sentence φ such that φ ∈ Truth but φ /∈ A.69 We say that
a set of natural numbers A is productive if there is a recursive function f (a
productive function for A) such that for any e, if We ⊆ A, then f(e) is de-
fined and f(e) ∈ A\We (f(e) is the witness thatWe 6= A). Given A,B ⊆ N,
define A ≤m B if there exists a recursive function f on N such that n ∈ A iff
f(n) ∈ B. We can prove that for A,B ⊆ N, if A ≤m B and A is productive,
then B is productive.70 Define C = {e : e /∈We}. Since C ≤m Truth and C
68Koellner concluded in [56] with a disjunctive conclusion of his own: “either the
statements that “the mind cannot be mechanized” and “there are absolutely undecidable
statements” are indefinite or they are definite and the above results provide evidence that
they are about as good examples of absolutely undecidable propositions as one might find”
([56], p.35-36).
69For the proof of this fact, we refer to Enderton [22], p.119.
70 I did not find a proof of this fact from the literature. Here I add a proof of it as follows.
Assume that f is a recursive function such that n ∈ A iff f(n) ∈ B; and g is a recursive
function such that if We ⊆ A, then g(e) ∈ A \We. Define f
−1(We) = {n : f(n) ∈ We}.
By the parameter theorem, there is a recursive function t such that f−1(We) =Wt(e) for
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is productive71, we have Truth is productive. Let EG1 denote the following
effective version of G1: there exists a recursive function f such that for any
e, if We ⊆ Truth, then f(e) is defined and f(e) ∈ Truth \We.
72
One misinterpretation of EG1 is that it refutes the first disjunct and sup-
ports the mechanism thesis. I would argue that the claim that EG1 refutes
the first disjunct is problematic. Remember that Th(Mn) is the set of sen-
tences produced by the Turing machine Mn. From EG1, there exists a re-
cursive function f such that for every n, if Th(Mn) is consistent then f(n) is
the Go¨del number of a true sentence of arithmetic which is not in Th(Mn).
In the rest of this paper, let f∗ be the fixed recursive function as asserted
in EG1.
From EG1, the mechanist may conclude that from the statement “I can
find a limitation in any given machine”, it by no means follows that I am not
a machine. The mechanist may use EG1 to claim that EG1 refutes the first
disjunct. Firstly, the mechanist may claim that if the human mind is just the
Turing machine which computes f∗ and simulates the procedure described
above, then this machine is not really worse than we human being since for
any Turing machine Mn, f
∗(n) picks up the true sentence of arithmetic not
produced by Mn. However, this is a misinterpretation of EG1 which in fact
says that, for any n, if Th(Mn) is consistent then f
∗(n) is the Go¨del number
of a true sentence of arithmetic which is not in Th(Mn). A natural question
is: whether there exists an effective procedure such that we can decide
whether Th(Mn) is consistent. Define B = {n : Th(Mn) is consistent}. We
can show that B is not recursive.73 Since B is undecidable, it is impossible
to effectively distinguish the case that Th(Mn) is consistent and the case
that Th(Mn) is not consistent. The claim that EG1 refutes the first disjunct
is problematic: EG1 does not refute the first disjunct.
The mechanist may claim that K can be enumerated by the Turing ma-
chine which computes function f∗. Let C = {f∗(n) : n ∈ N}. Since f∗ is
recursive, C is recursive enumerable. A natural question is: could be that
K = C? If K = C, then the first disjunct fails and the mechanism thesis
holds. However, we can show that C is inconsistent and hence K 6= C since
K is consistent by our assumption.74
In a summary, the claim that EG1 refutes the first disjunct and supports
the mechanism thesis is problematic. We cannot consistently conclude from
EG1 that the human mind is just the Turing machine which computes f∗.
any e ∈ N. Let h = f ◦ g ◦ t. We show that h is the productive function for B. Suppose
We ⊆ B. Since Wt(e) ⊆ A, we have g(t(e)) ∈ A \Wt(e) and so h(e) = f(g(t(e))) ∈ B \We.
71Since C is Π01 set, it is definable in the standard model of arithmetic; and the identity
function is just the productive function for C.
72〈We : e ∈ N〉 is the list of recursive enumerable subsets of N where We = {n ∈ N :
φe(n) ↓}.
73Suppose B is recursive. Let C = {f∗(n) : n ∈ B}. Then C is recursive enumerable.
Suppose C = Th(Mm) for some m. Note that C ⊆ Truth: for any n ∈ B, since Th(Mn)
is consistent we have f∗(n) ∈ Truth. So C is consistent. By the definition of B,m ∈ B
and hence f∗(m) ∈ C. But since Th(Mm) is consistent, by the definition of f
∗, f∗(m) is
not in Th(Mm) and hence f
∗(m) /∈ C which leads to a contradiction.
74Assume that C is consistent. Suppose that C = Th(Mk) for some k ∈ N. Since
Th(Mk) is consistent, f
∗(k) /∈ Th(Mk). But f
∗(k) ∈ C which leads to a contradiction.
So under our assumption that K is consistent, we have K 6= C.
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